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ABSTRACT  
The paper focuses on the reforms in the wage-setting system in Greece in the 
context of a severe recession and against the backdrop of EU bailout agreements. 
The analysis reveals that the reforms are also contested among key actors, and 
that the fault lines between social partners are not fully consistent with the notion 
of a binary pro-reform (from business associations) vs. anti-reform stance (from 
labour associations). Instead, our interview data expose hitherto hidden fractures 
in the employers’ camp. Employers’ representatives express –in varying degrees– 
their scepticism towards the efficacy of the institutional changes and generally 
towards technocratic solutions. More broadly this analysis reflects on the 
contested and controversial nature of the policy reforms on wage setting, for 
which there is no consensus either in the academic or policy literature, and delves 
deeper into the views and perspectives of key actors on the efficacy and 
consequences of the main institutional changes in wage setting. 
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1. Introduction  
Labour market regulation is considered an important aspect of a country’s overall 
regulatory framework due to its impact on working conditions and employment 
outcomes. In the context of the European Union (EU), Member States retain a 
degree of regulatory competence within national labour market frameworks (with 
the exception, of course, of areas where harmonising instruments, such as the EU 
Equality Directives or the Directives on information and consultation rights and 
health and safety, have established common rules). The approach adopted in the 
2000s was underpinned by the Open Method of Coordination (see, among others, 
Mosher and Trubek, 2003), whereby Member States were expected to engage in 
policy transfer and policy learning. Yet following the advent of the crisis, this 
voluntarist approach to structural reforms of the labour markets was radically 
transformed. 
The EU promoted a programme of labour market re-regulation, in which the 
stated aim was to rework the mix of labour market institutions to best reconcile 
economic competitiveness and social solidarity (Clasen et al., 2012). Nonetheless, 
the policy emphasis within the context of this flexicurity approach was on 
“flexibility” rather than “security” (Heyes and Lewis, 2014). To that end, the EU 
started issuing annual Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) to each member-
state in response to their National Reform Programmes (NRPs). As a result, many 
Member States were prompted to review and reform their employment relations 
and labour market regulatory frameworks, as a mechanism of adjustment to the 
recession and as a stepping-stone to increased competitiveness (Geary, 2016; 
Molina, 2014; Pedersini & Regini 2014; Rosário Palma Ramalho, 2014). According 
to a review by Clauwaert (2014), the CSRs issued in 2014/15 urged eleven 
countries to review wage-setting mechanisms and align them with productivity 
developments, while eight countries were expected to adjust their employment 
protection legislation (EPL) systems. 
Although the choice of phrasing in the CSR guidelines seems to allow the possibility 
of reforming wage-setting systems through a social partnership context, the 
general direction of travel points towards an outright decentralization of wage-
setting institutions. The rationale behind these policies reflects a crude 
conceptualization of the labour market, according to which the wage floor is 
considered a rigidity, incompatible with the efficient functioning of the market, 
and trade unions are, primarily, “rent-seeking” actors. Yet several authors argue 
that the policy case for deregulating the labour market is not borne out by studies 
that examine the relationship between various aspects of labour market 
institutions (such as the collective bargaining system) and labour market 
performance, as the empirical evidence remains inconclusive (Baccaro and Rei, 
2007; Baker et al., 2005). 
Within this turbulent political and economic context, Greece constitutes an 
interesting case study. Faced with an unprecedented sovereign debt and 
economic crisis at the end of 2009, the country was one of the first in a series of 
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EU Member States to seek financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was subsequently signed, which 
prescribed detailed policies that Greece was required to adopt with a view to 
entering a path of economic recovery and competitiveness. Contrary to other EU 
countries (such as Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) that also entered into similar 
agreements, the MoUs implemented in Greece included very detailed provisions 
regarding the deregulation of the country’s labour market and employment 
relations’ framework. 
This paper aims to critically examine the changes, prescribed by the MoUs, in the 
regulatory framework governing wage determination, through an analysis of the 
social partners’ views of these policies. In doing so, it will complement existing 
literature that has so far focused on the effects of the policies on several labour 
market outcomes (e.g. Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Baker et al., 2005; Boeri and van 
Ours, 2013; Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2014; Daouli et al, 2013; 
Theodoropoulou, 2016). Additionally, it will extend the literature that examined 
institutional changes and trade union responses to austerity (e.g. Campos Lima & 
Artiles, 2011; Geary, 2016; Ioannou, 2012; Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 2016; Molina, 
2014; Pedersini & Regini, 2014; Wood et al, 2015). 
Our analysis is based on a series of single person face-to-face interviews (or group 
interviews) with key informants from peak representative associations (GSEE, SEV, 
GSEVEE, ESEE, SETE) and relevant agencies and institutions (the Ministry of 
Labour, the Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) and the Organisation for Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED)). The fieldwork took place during July and August 2016.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following two sections set the 
context of the study, by briefly discussing the policy context in relation to the 
relevant literature and the changes the MoUs introduced in the wage-setting 
system. The fourth section examines the positions and the views of the social 
partners on the reforms of the wage-setting system and analyses their differing 
views. The final section provides an overall summary and concludes. 
 
 
2. The Policy Context: Internal Devaluation, Collective 
Bargaining and Competitiveness 
 
In May 2010, the first of a series of Memoranda of Understanding was signed 
between the Greek government and the so-called ‘Troika’ (EU 
Commission/ECB/IMF). The main aim of the first MoU was to establish 
institutional and fiscal rules that would help the country recover from the fiscal 
crisis it faced. An important aim of the MoU, among others, was the recalibration 
of the employment relations’ institutional framework – both in the public and 
private sectors – to drive down labour costs and realign them with productivity. 
Competitiveness, in that sense, would be achieved through a process of internal 
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devaluation, since the country – as a member of the Eurozone – could not rely on 
an independent monetary and exchange rate policy. 
 
The logic of internal devaluation was based on two assumptions: first, that in 
recent years, the growth of nominal wage costs had exceeded productivity growth 
(leading to an increase in unit labour costs), making the country less competitive 
in the export markets; second, that for wages to be downwardly adjusted, a radical 
transformation of the existing employment relations framework was required. The 
then existing framework was considered too strict and obstructive to change, so a 
process of recalibration, along the lines of further flexibility in the labour market 
and of decentralization of collective bargaining, commenced.  
 
The prevailing discourse of the period emphasised the beneficial effects of 
deregulation on competitiveness and, consequently, employment. Yet the fact of 
the matter is that evidence in support of this claim is, at best, inconclusive. First, 
international competitiveness is not first and foremost related to wage/price 
competitiveness (Fagerberg, 1988; 1996; Fagerberg et al., 2007; Dafermos and 
Nikolaidi, 2012). Moreover, the negative relationship between unit labour costs 
and export performance seems to be mostly driven by the productivity element of 
the former (Decramer et al., 2016). This is why even the European Central Bank’s 
economists (Altomonte et al., 2013) seem to be sceptical about the usefulness of 
the usual wage/price competitiveness indicators. Second, several authors (Baker 
et al., 2005; Howell et al., 2007; Baccaro and Rei, 2007) have argued that the policy 
case for the deregulation of the labour market cannot be borne out by the various 
studies that examine the relationship between aspects of labour market flexibility, 
on the one hand, and labour market performance, on the other. Reflecting the 
above evidence, the following quote from IMF economists, who discuss IMF’s 
advice on collective bargaining for the advanced economies, is quite telling:   
“This being said, the implications of alternative structures of collective 
bargaining are poorly understood [emphasis added]. This suggests that the 
IMF should tread carefully in its policy advice in this area, particularly since 
governments may have limited ability to reform existing systems. Moreover, 
trust among social partners appears to be just as important in bringing about 
macro flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining.” (Blanchard et al., 
2014: 20). 
Moreover, theories that stress the imperfect nature of labour markets point to the 
efficiency enhancing effects of institutions and legislation related to pay 
determination and employee representation (Agell, 1999; Aidt and Tzannatos, 
2002; Gregg and Manning, 1997). Inefficiencies arising from 
monopsonistic/oligopsonistic situations, transaction costs and externalities, mean 
that institutional and legislative regulation can lead to better outcomes in terms 
of quantity and quality relative to an unregulated labour market. For example, in 
a monopsonistic situation, both the equilibrium wage and employment are lower 
than the optimal level. Collective bargaining and minimum wage legislation in this 
case can lead to both higher wages and higher levels of employment (Gregg and 
Manning, 1997). By the same token, trade unions can also have a beneficial “voice” 
effect (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Dissatisfied employees that are unionised are 
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more likely to express their dissatisfaction to their employer than opt for the 
“voiceless” option of exiting the firm. This enables the development of long-term 
relationships between firms and employees and the investment in firm-specific 
skills through continuous training (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Howell, 2005) that 
can ultimately have a positive effect on productivity, firm performance in general, 
and the quality of working life for individual employees (e.g. through increased job 
security).  
Nevertheless, and despite the inherently problematic character of the policy 
arguments, the MoUs that were signed in 2010 and 2012 introduced a series of 
radical changes in the Greek employment relations’ framework. These have been 
analysed in detail elsewhere (Karamessini, 2012; Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012; 
Kornelakis and Voskeritsian, 2014), but a brief description of the changes 
pertaining specifically to the wage-setting regulatory framework is a necessary 
prelude to the discussion that will follow.  
 
 
3. Institutional Changes in the Wage-Setting System: An 
Overview 
 
The changes in the institutional framework of collective agreements and wage 
determination were gradually introduced into the existing framework. As 
discussed above, they were motivated by the need to align wages to productivity. 
One of the key changes as part of labour market reforms that affect the function 
and structure of collective bargaining related to the so-called ‘principle of 
favourability’, which was abolished. In a nutshell, the pre-crisis institutional 
framework suggested that sectoral/industry-wide collective agreements minima 
should not be set below the level set by the national minimum wage, whereas 
company-level agreements’ minima could not be set below that of sectoral 
agreements. In the case of cumulative application of different agreements 
(συρροή συμβάσεων), the one most favourable to employees would apply. 
 
More specifically, Law 3899/2010 and then Law 4024/2011 “Regulations of 
Collective Bargaining” enacted the following institutional framework:  
a) the possibility of signing company-level agreements with non-trade union 
representative bodies termed “Associations of Persons (AoPs)” (ενώσεις 
προσώπων); 
b) the possibility of concluding company-level agreements for enterprises 
which employ fewer than 50 employees (which used to be covered by 
sectoral agreements); 
c) the suspension of the “favourability principle” (αρχή της ευνοϊκότερης 
ρύθμισης) for as long as the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy is in effect (i.e. 
until 2015),** and the primacy of company-level collective agreements over 
sectoral agreements in the case of cumulative application; 
                                                     
** Article 37 (5) and (6) Law 4024/2011.  
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d) the suspension of the “extension principle” (αρχή της επεκτασιμότητας) of 
coverage of sectoral and occupational collective agreements. 
Due to the structure of the Greek employment relations system, wage 
determination was heavily dependent on the level of the national minimum wage 
(NMW) – which was agreed through social dialogue between the peak-level social 
partners – and which consequently set the basis for the level of wages that would 
be agreed at sectoral and occupational level. Another important feature of the 
system was also the inclusion of an erga omnes principle. The principle stipulated 
that a sectoral collective agreement that was signed between a trade union and 
employers or employers’ associations that represented at least 50%+1 of the 
workers in the respective sector, was applicable to all workers in the sector 
through a process involving the issuing of a ministerial decree. Although the law 
provided that the competent Minister of Labour would confirm that the 
aforementioned condition was satisfied, in practice the terms and conditions of 
almost every sectoral agreement were automatically extended to all workers in 
the sector. 
 
The Troika’s policies focused on weakening these two aspects of the wage-setting 
system. First, it sought to reduce the grip of sectoral agreements on firms that 
were not members of the signatory employers’ association. Second, it sought to 
change the level of the NMW that “set the pattern” for the determination of wages 
at sectoral, occupational or company levels. 
 
With the exception of a short lived attempt, in 2010, to disentangle the 
determination of wages at the company level from the ones negotiated at the 
sectoral level - through “special” company-level agreements†† - the government 
eventually introduced new legislation in 2011 (Law 4024/2011), which permitted 
company-level collective agreements to include terms and conditions of 
employment less favourable than those agreed at sectoral level. Effectively, the 
law “froze” the erga omnes and favourability principles, and led to a collapse of 
the wage bargaining system manifested by the dramatic decrease of sectoral 
agreements and the de facto decentralization of bargaining. This trend is 
documented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining, 2010 – 2015. 
Year Sectoral and occupational collective 
agreements 
Company level 
collective agreements 
2010 65 227 
2011 38 170 
2012 23 976 
2013 14 409 
2014 14 286 
                                                     
†† For more details on the short-lived arrangement of the Special Operational Collective Agreement 
(SOCA), see Kornelakis and Voskeritsian (2014). 
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2015 12 263 
Source: Greek Ministry of Labour, modified from Koukiadaki & Kokkinou (2016: 212).  
The changes were put in place with a view to introducing structural flexibility in 
the determination of wages. Although the law explicitly envisaged that the 
temporary suspension of these principles would have effect only for the duration 
of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy, in practice the suspension remains very much 
in force. 
 
 
4. Wage-Setting System Reforms and the Social Partners’ 
Perspective 
 
4.1. Decentralization of Collective Bargaining  
The responses of the social partners to the de facto decentralisation of collective 
bargaining were variable and this section will seek to document the fault lines and 
hidden fractures in their perspectives. An interesting fracture was observed in the 
employers’ camp. The views of SEV – which represents big businesses and heavy 
industry – and the views of ESEE and GSEVEE – which represent artisans, 
commercial enterprises, and small businesses, were diverging. ESEE and GSEVEE 
seemed to be more supportive of the sectoral collective bargaining, because of 
the economies of scale and transaction costs minimization and the avoidance of a 
“race-to-bottom” in wages and working conditions. SEV, in contrast, although 
supportive of sectoral collective bargaining, clearly indicated that company level 
agreements should take precedence over sectoral agreements: 
"We believe that the company level Collective Agreements (CAs) should prevail 
[i.e. over the sectoral CAs], as every business is aware of its own strengths, and 
knows the level of wages [it can afford]. If there is no company level [CA], then 
there could be coverage from a sectoral CA. In line with this rationale, we are 
of the view that a company level CA should be allowed to deviate from a 
sectoral CA when a company cannot survive or cannot follow its course." 
(Interviewee SEV, 29/7/2016). 
A similar position was expressed by the SETE interviewee: 
"…On the one hand I believe that the institution of the company level [CAs] 
should continue to exist, but in parallel with the sectoral [CAs] – we have 
proved that we are in favour of sectoral CAs – and [the company level CAs 
should] prevail over the sectoral CAs, simply because in some companies the 
conditions could be such that allow for better wages – and this is the case in 
some sectors and in some companies – as it can also be the case that special 
conditions may not allow this, and reduced wages may be required for the 
company to survive." (Interviewee SETE, 29/8/2016). 
Although the previous framework allowed a company level collective agreement 
to derogate from a sectoral one, this could only happen if and only if terms and 
conditions of employment of the former were more favourable than the latter’s. 
What our interlocutors argued, however, is that such a derogation should be 
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permitted irrespective of the content of the company level collective agreement 
compared to the sectoral one (i.e. as is the case under the current framework). 
Interestingly enough, GSEVEE considered such an approach as deviating from 
European best practices: 
"The one diverging from European practices is the one who, on the one hand, 
wants national CAs but does not want sectoral CAs and wants company level 
CAs. Why is that so, though? Could it be because it [i.e. the employers' 
association] represents companies and not sectors?" (Interviewee GSEVEE, 
4/8/2016). 
 
The conflicting views over the structural hierarchy of collective agreements are 
founded on the social partners’ concerns about the survival and profitability of 
enterprises. Those representing sectors of the economy where very big or very 
flexible businesses operate are in favour of further wage flexibilization – to better 
reflect the labour cost demands of the specific businesses. The company level 
agreements, therefore, become a tool to undercut the perceived inflexibility of 
the sectoral agreement, as has been shown in sectoral cases such as 
telecommunications (Kornelakis, 2016). 
In contrast, those representing very small businesses, or businesses where the ties 
between an employer and an employee are traditionally very strong (as is the case 
of commerce), favour sectoral bargaining. As our GSEVEE interviewee vividly 
argued: 
"A sectoral CA, which is signed by an employers' association and a [sectoral] 
trade union, certainly represents the sector's interests much better than an 
Association of Persons or a single employer could do." (Interviewee GSEVEE, 
4/8/2016). 
 
 
4.2. New Structures of Representation 
The new framework achieved a recalibration of power allocation in the 
employment relationship, by allowing companies to determine their employees’ 
wages without depending on the provisions agreed at the sectoral level. However, 
an apparent problem concerned the issue of representation. Due to the structure 
of the Greek capitalist system (with more than 90% of companies employing fewer 
than 20 employees) and the legal requirement for a minimum of 21 members for 
the establishment of a trade union, a pragmatic complication became apparent. 
Up until 2011, a firm-level agreement could only be signed by either a company 
level trade union or a local sectoral (or occupational) union. What happened, then, 
in cases where such bodies did not exist or could not have existed due to the 
company’s small size? As we saw in the previous section, to resolve this practical 
problem, Law 4024/2011 introduced a new potential actor in the collective 
bargaining process: the so-called Association of Persons (AoP). The AoP can be 
established in any company – irrespective of size – and has the power to sign a 
collective agreement with the company’s management, as long as it represents 
3/5 of the company’s employees. Thus, a collective agreement can now be signed 
without the need to include trade unions in the process. 
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The AoPs are, perhaps, one of the most contested ‘innovations’ of the new 
regulatory framework. Although their declared raison d’ être was to extend the 
reach of collective bargaining to companies in which the exercise of such a right 
was hitherto impossible due to their size, in reality they functioned as a Trojan 
Horse for a redistribution of power in the employment relationship. AoPs may 
have been given the power to negotiate collective agreements, but they do not 
enjoy any of the other rights afforded to established trade unions. Thus, they have 
no right to strike, their members are not protected (as trade unionists are) vis-à-
vis authoritarian managerial practices, and their membership may include 
managers or employers (in breach of a fundamental principle of free trade 
unionism, whereby only employees or workers may be members of a trade union). 
As a consequence, they are particularly vulnerable to adversarial managerial 
behaviours. As our interlocutor from the Labour Inspectorate colourfully stated: “I 
regard [the collective agreements signed by the AoPs] as ‘self-enforcing 
agreements’” (Interviewee Labour Inspectorate, 25/7/2016). Our GSEE 
interviewee further clarified and supported this view: 
"Currently, 99.9% of the established AoPs are instruments controlled by the 
employers. Those participating in them are primarily business executives, 
managers. It is forbidden for managers and employers' representatives to 
participate in trade unions. In the AoPs we observe that, in most cases, the vast 
majority [of members] are executives [who enjoy] the employer's immediate 
trust. Therefore, what kind of trade union representation can we be talking 
about with these constructs? The employer has five executives found an AoP 
and they sign a custom-made CA to fit [the employer's] purposes; they then, 
later, impose it on the rest of the staff who may not agree with it but do not 
have the ability to react" (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016) 
This dependency on the employer is problematic in its own right, both with regard 
to the quality of collective bargaining and in terms of its outcomes. The Labour 
Inspectorate interviewee, for instance, argued that “[t]here exist company-level 
collective agreements that go so far as to stipulate individualised wages for every 
single employee", while there are several examples of how this institution has 
been abused by employers. Two of our interlocutors (one from the Ministry of 
Labour and one from the GSEE), for example, provided such an example: 
"There are hotels that during the winter months employ four to five employees, 
i.e. the managers. They sign a company level CA in winter, they hire fifty to 
sixty employees in the summer, and the CA signed by five people is imposed on 
the 60 and 70 [new employees]. Such abusive practices exist, but they are 
related to the specific deregulatory interventions that took place in recent 
years in collective bargaining". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
In other cases, the wages agreed in such collective agreements may also be illegal, 
as they are below the level of the NMW: 
"We had a recent case where the company level CA that was signed [agreed 
on wages] that were below the NMW. As a matter of fact, this CA was 
submitted to the Ministry of Employment, was filed, and was uploaded on the 
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Ministry's website, and it still appears there [at the time of the interview]" 
(Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
 The above examples are indicative of the nature of the AoPs, which is such that 
effectively prohibits the conduct of free negotiations between the two parties. As 
the GSEE interviewee argued: 
"We have very small businesses where the employees are the weak link, 
because I cannot imagine how in a company of 10-15 employees, where there 
is an everyday interaction with the employer, [the employees] at the company 
level could have the power and the ability to negotiate on equal terms a 
company level CA". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
 
4.3. Determination and Level of Wages  
In addition to the issue of representation, the Troika was also concerned with the 
level of the wages that could be agreed. Law 4024/2011stipulated that although 
the wages agreed in a firm-level agreement could be lower than wages agreed in 
a sectoral agreement, they could not fall below the level of the NMW. Although 
the social partners had already agreed in a freezing of the NMW in the 2010 
national collective agreement (standing at €751.39 for an inexperienced unskilled 
worker), in 2012 the government unilaterally decided to change the process of the 
NMW determination. Law 4046/2012 and Act of Cabinet 6/2012 introduced the 
statutory regulation of the NMW, and also reduced its level by 22% for employees 
over the age of 25 (to €586.08), and by 32% for employees below the age of 25 (to 
€510.95). 
As one might expect, this policy was not totally embraced by the social partners. 
All of the peak employers’ associations argued for a return to the previous system 
of setting the minimum wage via free collective bargaining between 
representative associations. As the representative from SEV indicated: 
“The point on which we all agree is the return to the universality of the National 
General Collective Agreement (EGSSE), and by this we mean that the national 
minimum wage should be defined by the EGSSE. At the moment, this 
[universality] has changed with the latest legal framework; the minimum 
wage, if we were to set it at the national level by the EGSSE, would be 
applicable only to our members, whereas the national minimum wage that is 
applicable to all the employees in the country is defined by the decision of the 
Ministry of Employment. The [proposed] system by which the minimum wage 
will be set has not started functioning yet. We have our reservations in relation 
to various issues, predominantly regarding how the advisory part will be 
structured, because it appears that the role of the social partners will be 
advisory and consultative.” (Interviewee SEV, 29/7/2016) 
The importance of the role of the social partners under a proposed new system 
appears to be a critical objection to the proposed reforms and this reflects a broad 
consensus across both employer representatives and trade union representatives. 
As the SEV representative explains further: 
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“… there is an advisory/consultative body, in which the social partners 
participate, along with higher education institutions, the Bank of Greece, and 
others. We suggest that this body should be comprised only by the social 
partners, who are signatories to the EGSSE and no-one else, because these are 
the representatives of Greek entrepreneurship, on the one hand, and the 
employees of the country, on the other. Everyone else should be able to provide 
evidence and data, but should not be able to provide an opinion or advise the 
State so as to set minimum wages.” (Interviewee SEV, 29/7/2016) 
“The objections that have been put forward do not concern the whole system, 
but the part of that which suggests that the Minister engages into consultation 
with all the previous institutional actors that I mentioned.” (Interviewee SEV, 
29/7/2016) 
Interestingly, other employers’ associations representing small and medium sized 
enterprises or commercial firms share this position.  As the representatives from 
the GSEVEE and ESSE suggested: 
“The bold intervention of the state in 2012, under the pretext of [increasing] 
competitiveness and reducing unemployment, was mandated by the creditors 
and the interests of large corporations in the country. It did not bring the 
expected results. Besides, GSEVEE, also in their discussions with the then Prime 
Minister, Mr. Loukas Papademos, had categorically emphasised that it does 
not consent to the state intervention in [i.e. statutory regulation of] the 
national minimum wage and, in the words of the then President [of GSEVEE], 
declared to the Prime Minister, that, if the country is unable to guarantee €751, 
then it should formally declare bankruptcy, because in essence it is already 
bankrupt. We are requesting to return the wage-setting system to the social 
partners, taking into account the (economic) situation as it has developed.” 
(Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
Although we will return to the question of the level of the minimum wage, the 
representative of ESEE has also argued along similar lines: 
“As far as the issue of free collective bargaining and the setting of the level of 
the minimum wage is concerned, you are very well aware of the fact that, when 
there was an agreement between the social partners, this agreement ended 
up with the competent Minister for a simple ratification. We request the 
restoration of this process, [we do] not [want] the setting of the level of the 
minimum wage by the creditors, and then the simple acceptance of this 
proposal by the competent Minister without the participation of the employers 
and employees. The EGSSE has, I believe, been based on this exact philosophy, 
to allow the existence of social dialogue, as it happens in most countries in 
Europe and even in Germany, where, as you said, there is no EGSSE, but there 
are sectoral agreements and free collective bargaining. I do not understand 
why we should not have this freedom of self-regulation of the market in our 
hands. I hold the view that no Minister and no government is fully aware of the 
real conditions of the market and is not able to make sense of them.” 
(Interviewee ESEE, 21/7/2016) 
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Finally, the consensus in favour of returning to the previous status quo of setting 
minimum wages by collective bargaining is shared by the representatives of 
employees: 
“Firstly, we have to make an acknowledgement. Since 1990, by the voting of 
the Law 1876/1990 on free collective bargaining, this law has been one of the 
most democratic at the level of the European Union, which gives the 
opportunity to the social partners, either at the national level or at the 
industry-level or at the firm-level, to negotiate among themselves and agree 
the terms and conditions of work. […] There was no problem with the 
implementation of this law, which was embraced by all social partners. 
Admittedly, there were some irregularities or abnormalities, as it may happen 
with the implementation of any legal framework, and we would have been 
open, if we were invited to a discussion on the improvement of this legal 
framework” (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016).  
“Now, as far as the role of the state is concerned: the state may have the role 
of the regulator; [setting] the rules of the game, but it cannot, however, be the 
actor who imposes the decisions, who intervenes for the minimum wage and 
will set the minimum wage. And here there is a contradiction, which is why I 
spoke before about ideological obsessions. On the one hand, we speak about 
free markets, liberal economy, for enterprises and an economy that is not 
subject to restrictions, and, on the other hand, we are heading towards 
something that is totally different from what we assert, we are heading 
towards the imposition of state decisions, which should have been taken by the 
players who are part of this game. The state is not just undertaking the role of 
the arbitrator, but functions as an authoritarian state by changing all the rules 
of the game, especially in the collective agreements. (Interviewee GSEE, 
30/8/2016). 
It transpires from the interviews that there is a mistrust towards the role of the 
state by all social partners. This mistrust is best explained historically, as a residue 
of the way that ‘state corporatism’ has operated in Greece. In an unusual degree 
of consensus among social partners, all key actors required the minimum wages 
to be set freely by them without any state intervention. They justify this on the 
“logic of appropriateness”: they are better informed about the labour market, and 
thus, better placed to set the minimum wage. They are open (for instance SEV) to 
accept data and evidence from other actors (academics, Bank of Greece, etc.). But 
the bottom line is that they want to be the ones who set the minimum wage. 
More broadly, there are some delicate differences in the details around minimum 
wages, outlined above, but all social partners seem open to improvements of the 
wage setting framework. Additionally, the fault lines do not fully follow the binary 
logic of employers being pro-reform vs. trade unions’ being anti-reform. Instead, 
representatives of small and medium sized firms and commerce (GSEVEE and 
ESEE) are more critical of the reforms than representatives of large firms (SEV). 
The reaction of the social partners towards the effectiveness of this policy was 
more ambivalent than one might expect. Our discussant from the ESEE, for 
example, was very sceptical about the efficacy of the reduction of the NMW in 
boosting competitiveness and tackling unemployment. As he claimed: 
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"It must be understood, as is also demonstrated by the trajectory of the 
changes, through very aggressive interventions in employment relations, that 
the result was negative, both with regard to unemployment and insofar as the 
competitiveness of Greek enterprises is concerned. As a matter of fact, within 
a year, our country dropped six places and is now in the 62nd place with regard 
to competitiveness, a fact that does not confirm the theory that wage 
reductions and employment flexibility will act to contain the level of 
unemployment" (Interviewee ESEE, 21/7/2016). 
A similar perception was broadly shared both by the GSEVEE and the GSEE, and by 
our interviewees from the Ministry of Labour who, referring to the effect of the 
32% reduction in the NMW on the unemployment levels of young employees (i.e. 
below the age of 25), stated that:  
"It does not appear [i.e. the reduction in the NMW] to have any significant 
impact, especially on young employees below the age of 25, for whom a lower 
NMW threshold exists. Unemployment for them is high and it does not appear 
to have been influenced by the level of wage".  (Interviewee Ministry of Labour, 
29/7/2016). 
A common thread linking the employers’ associations with the GSEE was their view 
that the current level of the NMW is quite low and needs to be increased; where 
they differed, however, was on the specific level that it should reach. ESEE, for 
instance, argued for a gradual re-instatement of the NMW to the pre-crisis levels 
(i.e. 751 euros), whereas GSEVEE and SEV argued that, although the NMW should 
be determined through tripartite collective bargaining, its precise level could not 
be determined in advance but should be related to the actual conditions of the 
market.  
The decision, in 2012, to determine the NMW via statutory regulation was, as one 
could expect, negatively received by the social partners. Although one could 
attribute their reactions to the fact that this measure led to a reduction of their 
relative power in the industrial relations arena (since the determination of the 
NMW was one of their primary functions), in reality the feeling expressed during 
the interviews was one of resentment: by passing the determination of the NMW 
on to the political sphere, the social partners felt that the Troika (and, by extent, 
the state) did not trust their ability to effectively regulate the labour market. As 
our GSEE interviewee put it: 
"In 2010, in the midst of the MoU and the county's commitments, the social 
partners decided that the mixture of economic policy was not the one that the 
labour market needed and we signed the 3-year National Collective 
Agreement, which provided for wage increases at the level of the European 
inflation every year (1%). Why did we do this? Because we really wanted to 
send a positive message to the market and the private [sector of the] economy. 
We are all aware that an important part of the crisis is psychological. We 
wanted to send a positive message. I do not think that, taking into 
consideration the historical trajectory and the experience of the social 
partners, we are not aware of what is in the best interests of our members, be 
they employers or employees, and that we need somebody to impose on us 
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some things, because they believe they know better than us what is in our 
interest. I think that we, who move in the market, either as employees or 
employers, or entrepreneurs or self-employed, we know much better how to 
regulate this market" (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The statutory regulation of the NMW was, therefore, interpreted not only as an 
attack on the collective autonomy of the social partners and on free collective 
bargaining, but also – and perhaps even more importantly – as a questioning of 
the social partners’ position as trustworthy and responsible interlocutors in the 
industrial relations arena. Again, our GSEE interviewee stressed this perception 
very clearly: 
"In 2012, and while the National Collective Agreement that the social partners 
had signed in 2010 was still in force, the state steps in after pressure from the 
creditors, and with the 6th Ministerial Council Decree effectively annuls the 
agreement. The social partners, that is, have signed an agreement, they know 
perfectly well what they have signed and what they have negotiated, and then 
comes the state to tell them, without wanting to go into detail about the 
pressures the government was facing at that period, that they do not know 
what their interest is and what they sign. Therefore, with a Ministerial Council 
Decree [the government] deregulates, it abolishes the current framework of 
free collective bargaining, it also abolishes the NMW that has been agreed, 
and from 751 euros brings it down to 586 euros. This happened under the 
pretext of improving competitiveness and creating new jobs". (Interviewee 
GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The issue of trust notwithstanding, the statutory determination of the NMW (and 
its subsequent reduction) also served the important function of indirectly reducing 
the level of sectoral wages. Traditionally, sectoral and occupational wage 
increases were linked not only to the level of the NMW but also to the specific 
percentage that the NMW had increased by in the latest national collective 
agreement. This linkage created inflationary phenomena, as some of our 
interlocutors admitted: 
"First of all, those who argue that there was an inflationary tendency in the 
[wage determination] of the sectoral agreements have a point. In Greece a bad 
practice existed, and we, the social partners, shared in it, according to which 
there was a direct link between increases in the sectoral CA and the increases 
that were provided in the national CA. [This practice] had the opposite result 
on the NMW. In other words, the NMW increased by 5%, the sectoral CA, either 
at the negotiations stage or at the mediation and arbitration stage, took as a 
base the increase in the NMW, and the negotiation started for a level above 
the 5% of the national collective agreement. This created an inflationary 
tendency. Of course, this was also a rationale shared by the employers before 
the crisis, who could very easily pass any increase in the NMW or the sectoral 
wage on to the consumer. That this was a bad practice is not something that 
we discovered now because of the crisis, we had already confronted it in an 
OMED conference in 2010". (Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016). 
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A similar view was also shared by our OMED interviewee: 
"The parties were coming to OMED and, premised on the percentage [of 
increase] agreed in the national CA asked for additional increases through the 
sectoral CA. In this way an internal revaluation effectively took place, [which 
was] contrary to any economic logic with a hard euro. If this had not been 
realised in 2009 or 2010, it should have been realised in 2012 and the 
devaluation should have taken place … if the NMW was following the Greek 
inflation it would have been around 600 euros". (Interviewee OMED, 
21/7/2016). 
In contrast, the GSEE representative presented an alternative logic that linked the 
increases in wages to the growth of the respective sectors: 
"With regard to the inflationary tendencies, I would say that the average of the 
increases we were discussing during the good times was around the level of 
inflation; we were actually negotiating to pay the level of inflation or, in some 
sectors where there was growth and high productivity, there was something 
more in the agreement. It never exceeded the indices of the growth in 
productivity however. Let me remind you of the swift growth of the Greek 
economy from the beginning of 2000 where, for at least eight years, we had a 
rapid increase of the financial results of businesses and an increase in 
productivity rates which was very high [in comparison with] the EU [averages]. 
Therefore, what the employees did was to negotiate increases, under extreme 
difficulties and objections, with a view to receiving a part of this increase in the 
GDP. There was not something truly outrageous with regard to the 
employees". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
The level of the minimum wage and the relationship between the NMW increases 
and productivity growth merits a thorough analysis that goes beyond the aims of 
this paper. Still, it is possible to attempt a brief examination of the available data 
with a view to gauging how this relationship has played out in the Greek context. 
The usual measure of the level of the minimum wage for comparative purposes is 
the Kaitz index, presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Minimum wage level in selected countries (Kaitz index) 
 2008 2015 
Greece 0.48 0.47 
France 0.63 0.62 
Germany - 0.48 
Ireland 0.52 0.44 
Portugal 0.49 0.57 
Spain 0.39 0.37 
UK 0.46 0.49 
Source: OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 18/01/2017). Notes: 
The Kaitz index calculates the ratio of minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees. 
 
The Kaitz index essentially measures the “bite” of the minimum wage by 
calculating the ratio of the minimum to the median (or average) wage. A relatively 
high minimum wage can be observed in France, while a relatively low one is 
observed in Spain. Greece is somewhere in the middle of the ranking, both in 2008 
and in 2015, with a bite of the minimum similar to that in Germany and the UK. 
The large decline in the minimum wage in the post-2012 period is not reflected in 
the data presented due to, first, a sharp increase in the Kaitz index during 2010-
2011, and, second, the equally significant (but more gradual) decline in the median 
wage.  
This evolution is shown in Figure 1, along with a longer-term decline in the Kaitz 
index since the beginning of the ‘90s, resulting from the wage moderation 
exhibited by the social partners negotiating the national collective agreement.  
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Figure 1 The evolution of the minimum wage in Greece (Kaitz index)  
 
Source: OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 18/01/2017). Notes: The Kaitz 
index here is the ratio of minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees. 
This moderation is also evident in Figure 2. The real value of the minimum wage 
since 2000 is plotted there alongside the contemporaneous evolution in the level 
of productivity. Up to 2007, we can observe relatively lower increases in the real 
minimum wage relative to the growth in productivity.‡‡ Obviously, the social 
partners adopted a cautious approach to minimum wage setting, avoiding 
“excessive” increases. In contrast, some apparent “rigidity” in the system is 
evident during the years 2008-2010, in a period when productivity was declining 
rapidly while the minimum wage remained relatively stable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
‡‡ Extending the calculations back to the ‘90s (not shown in Figure 2) also reveals that, while 
productivity grew by 13 per cent during that decade, the real value of the annual minimum 
earnings remained stable. 
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
  
 
17 
Figure 2 Real minimum wages and productivity in Greece (2000=100) 
 
Source: Real minimum wage from OECD.Stat, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed on 
13/10/2016); productivity from AMECO database (series RVGDE), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm (accessed on 13/10/2016). Notes: 
2000=100; “Real minimum wage” is the annual minimum wage of full-time employees in 2014 constant prices 
at 2014 US dollar PPPs. “Productivity” is real GDP per person employed.  
 
Hence, the increases in the real value of the minimum wage in Greece were in 
general (apart from the 2008-2010 period) in line with productivity growth. 
Moreover, the bite of the minimum wage cannot be considered restrictive by 
European standards.  
However, the Troika’s argument was different. The rationale for internal 
devaluation was the gradual decline in Greece’s competitiveness during its era of 
membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This decline was the 
result of excessive nominal wage increases that far outpaced productivity growth 
and led to an increase in unit labour costs (see Theodoropoulou, 2016). The real 
wage moderation revealed by the Figures above can be consistent with a decline 
in competitiveness as measured by the unit labour costs and probably explains the 
differing views among the social partners.  
It must be apparent from the above discussion that there are more than one ways 
to interpret wage increases and their relationship to competitiveness. There may 
be different policy conclusions depending on the measures that one looks (e.g. 
unit labour costs), whereas the relationship between labour market institutions 
and competitiveness represents a ‘contested terrain’. 
Notwithstanding, the changes in the collective bargaining regulatory framework 
opened up the way for a steep decline in wages as a company was effectively free 
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– at least in theory – to reduce its employees’ wages to the level of the (now 
greatly reduced) NMW without being restrained by any sectoral or occupational 
collective agreements. This could be achieved either by signing a firm-level 
agreement with the company trade union or the AoP or by unilaterally deciding to 
proceed as such (i.e. without collective bargaining). 
 
4.4. Employment Relations and the Greek Model of Production in  
Recession 
A common position shared by almost all of our interviewees was their staunch 
disagreement with many of the policies that were introduced in the preceding 
years. In their view, the deregulation of employment relations, combined with the 
harsh economic environment, has led to more problems than the ones it originally 
set out to resolve. As our GSEVEE interviewee argued: 
"The businesses have cumulatively lost, during the crisis, about 70-75% of their 
turnover. The biggest problem is unemployment, when almost 1.5 million of 
our fellow citizens are not employed, according to official data. In our view, this 
number is well above 1.5 million as, for example, merchants and craftsmen and 
their family members who assist them, companies that have shut down during 
the crisis – and according to data from the European Commission they are 
around 250.000 - are not registered anywhere. The country's competitiveness 
was not helped by the reduction of the NMW. Greece, during the crisis years, 
lost, if I am not mistaken, about four places in global competitiveness. Let me 
remind you that in October 2011 unemployment in Greece was 19.1%. Despite 
the interference with the NMW, unemployment exploded to 27%, it now stands 
at 25%. Of course, the flexible forms of employment and the seasonality of 
various occupations, as in the tourism sector, contributed to this reduction." 
(Interviewee GSEVEE, 4/8/2016) 
Our ESEE and GSEE interlocutors painted a similar picture, with slight 
modifications. In their view, the mixture of economic policies that were imposed 
on Greece further reinforced the vicious circle of economic decline. A case in point 
was the level of taxation and of non-wage costs that were deemed too high to be 
shouldered by small and medium enterprises. Yet, as the GSEE interviewee 
argued: 
"I think that the problem is neither taxation nor social security contributions. 
The problem is that the turnover of businesses has significantly, dramatically I 
would say, shrunk. And since the turnover has been dramatically reduced 
everything is to blame. I would say that, even if a very generous provision was 
introduced that halved employers’ social security contributions or stipulated 
that for the following two years, because of the crisis, no employer would pay 
social security contributions, the companies would still be unable to cope, there 
would still be issues, flexible employment would still exist, exploitation would 
still exist". (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
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The question of the country’s model of production and growth strategy emerged 
again and again in our discussions, pointing to the fact that the social partners 
were well aware of both the structural problems of the Greek economy and the 
need to address them collectively. Again, the GSEE interviewee was adamant 
about the need for a tripartite social dialogue that could set the bases for 
rebooting the economy: 
"[t]he problem is not to regulate or deregulate free collective bargaining and 
suddenly, if we regulate or deregulate [collective bargaining], the private 
sector will start to function. We need to leave these issues a bit further behind, 
because we deal with them for 6 years now, and we have not sat down to 
consider how we can plan growth strategies together, which is what is needed, 
which will generate new jobs, which will increase businesses' revenues and the 
GDP, to envisage a different philosophy with a different strategy. We have not 
discussed this, we did not have the time, because all the time we are focusing 
on what we can deregulate." (Interviewee GSEE, 30/8/2016). 
This is not to say that the system of industrial relations, as it functioned prior to 
2010, was flawless or in no need of fine-tuning. On the contrary, as was evident 
from the above discussions, the social partners had contrasting views regarding 
the functionality of several aspects of the system (such as the hierarchy of 
collective agreements, or the level of the NMW). However, almost all seemed to 
concur with two points: first, that the changes introduced in the employment 
relations system were not properly linked to a wider policy of economic 
rejuvenation and, second, that the drafting of any such policies (regarding both 
the production and the employment relations model of Greece) should have 
involved the social partners in one way or another. The external imposition of such 
policies by the Troika, with no proper social dialogue and without taking into 
consideration the experience and expertise of the social partners, resulted, 
according to our interviewees’ assessment, in adverse economic and social 
consequences. The underlying message that came out of all our discussions was 
that, if the country is to get back on a path of economic development, then the 
productive classes responsible for this should have the ability to engage into 
proper social dialogue and have the opportunity to decide among themselves the 
appropriate policy mixture. Trust, in this respect, is of the essence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The recent Eurozone crisis radically changed the approach adopted by the EU 
towards labour market reforms. Strictly speaking, national labour market 
frameworks remain a competence of the member-states. However, in recent 
years, as part of the process of the European Semester, the EU has been more 
active towards close monitoring of the implementation of structural reforms in 
the labour market, through National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and Country 
Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The general direction of travel has been one 
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towards decentralizing collective bargaining to improve the link between labour 
costs and productivity. 
Our review of relevant research suggests that the effects of alternative structures 
of collective bargaining on employment performance and competiveness are 
unclear, and the studies are overall inconclusive. Academic economists are quite 
cautious in the policy interpretation of their results, while trust among social 
partners appears to be just as important in bringing about macro flexibility at the 
structure of collective bargaining.  
In this policy context, the paper sought to delve deeper into the responses and 
perspectives of the social partners on the enforced changes in the regulation of 
collective bargaining. This analysis revealed some of the hidden fractures and fault 
lines between and within social partners.  
As far as collective bargaining centralization and decentralization are concerned, 
there is a variety of perspectives reflecting a “cherry-picking” approach with 
different actors giving primacy to different levels of collective bargaining. For 
instance, SEV was more favourable towards company-level agreements, with a 
complementary role envisaged for sectoral agreements. On the other side, GSEE 
was in favour of sectoral and occupational agreements with a complementary role 
for company-level agreements. On the area of representation, the Association of 
Persons (AoPs) is one of the most controversial ‘innovations’ of the new regulatory 
framework. Although their rationale was to extend the reach of collective 
bargaining to small companies, in reality the AoPs seem to have functioned as a 
Trojan horse to drive decentralization of wage bargaining and internal 
devaluation. The trade unions’ side highlighted the fact that these structures 
appear to be predominantly employer-controlled. 
With regard to the setting of the national minimum wage, there appears to be 
consensus among actors. All of them support the return to the previous 
institutional framework and setting of the NMW by a national general collective 
agreement (EGSEE). The social partners, however, provided different perspectives 
when attempting to explain excessive wage increases in the past.  
The employers’ organizations argued that the previous system might have led to 
some inflationary pressures, whereas the trade union side suggested that the 
increases always followed inflation and productivity increases. The picture 
emerging from the data, suggests that real minimum wage increases were in line 
with productivity and prices up until 2009, and there is only a two-year period 
during which said increases were above productivity and inflation. However, the 
real wage moderation revealed by our data can be consistent with a decline in 
competitiveness as measured by the unit labour costs (that are calculated based 
on nominal wages) and probably explains the differing views among the social 
partners.  
Finally, all social partners highlighted the importance of overcoming the recession 
and modernizing the model of production in Greece, emphasizing that some of the 
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key problems are not resolved by structural reforms and downward wage 
adjustment.  
To conclude, the analysis suggests that the fault lines between and within social 
partners have been more nuanced and complex than expected. The employers’ 
side was not wholeheartedly in favour of the imposed market-friendly and pro-
business reforms. Vice versa, the trade unions’ side was not straightforwardly 
against any change or against a potential recalibration of the system, and accepted 
that there were dysfunctional components in the previous system. 
Two additional key themes transpired from this exploration: first, a distrust 
towards the state, and second, scepticism towards technocratic solutions. On the 
one hand, the social actors were not really confident that the state would best 
serve the interests of their members. For instance, all social partners agreed on 
the need to return to the previous system. They insisted that they have the best 
knowledge of labour market conditions to determine minimum wages, so this 
should fall within their remit.  
Scepticism towards technocracy was also evident in the discourse of the key 
actors. Although there was no ‘shared understanding’ of key actors with regard to 
the overall shape of the wage bargaining system and its distinctive features, the 
common thread is that none of the social partners fully supported the current 
direction of institutional change in the wage-setting system. 
Overall, the paper highlighted some of the contradictions of the recent policy 
reforms in wage setting. Although the institutional changes were supposed to be 
carried out in the spirit of social partnership (following on from EU best practices) 
the fact of the matter was that there was little consultation in the process and 
eventually the institutional changes were imposed on the basis of typical financial 
conditionality. 
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